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Introduction
The markets for venture capital (VC) and initial public offerings (IPOs) are usually 
closely linked because the going public of a firm offers an important exit opportunity for early 
investors. This applies especially for hot issue markets, i.e., periods in which equity prices are 
extraordinary high and the number of IPOs increases dramatically (Lemer, 1994). Thus, the 
opening of a new stock market segment for high tech growth firms at the German Stock Ex­
change in 1997 - called Neuer Markt - offered venture capitalists the opportunity for more effi­
cient and profitable exit strategies. This new market segment also set off a strong increase in 
venture capital financing for start-up firms in Germany. The year 1997 was also the beginning 
of a period of dramatically increasing stock prices world wide and particularly in the German 
Neuer Markt with index returns of up to 1,600% from March 1997 to March 2000 as measured 
by the Nemax {Neuer Markt Index). In fact, the Neuer Markt with its 329 listings became the 
most successful market for growth firms in Europe during that period. Unfortunately, due to an 
extremely poor performance of minus 96% of the Nemax from its peak in March 2000 and 
many scandals and bankruptcies, it was eventually closed as a market segment in March 2003. 
Of the 329 IPOs, 297 are now listed in the Prime Standard or General Standard segment of the 
German Stock Exchange, 18 were acquired, and 14 failed. Thus, an analysis of the Neuer Markt 
offers a great opportunity to analyze whether venture-backed IPOs are more successful than 
non venture-backed IPOs and whether venture capitalists are able to time their exit well. This 
latter aspect is especially interesting because the investors in the Neuer Markt were constrained 
by mandatory lock-up periods of six months.
The objective of venture capitalists usually consists of investing in promising private 
companies at attractive prices and selling them at much higher prices. One sensible exit route 
for successful ventures is going public and selling shares either in the primary or secondary 
market. Hot issue markets usually provide an ideal setting for such an exit. Gompers and Lemer
(2003) find that realized VC returns are typically above average in hot issue markets and below 
average in cold issue markets. Because the underpricing of IPOs is particularly high in hot issue 
markets, it seems sensible for the VC not to exit at the time of the IPO but to sell the shares in 
the secondary market. However, if the lock-up period expires after the stock market has peaked, 
the venture capitalist may loose the opportunity for an optimal exit. In fact, the time window 
for exit at relatively high prices was very limited in the Neuer Markt and lasted only several 
months. Moreover, there was a time gap of six months between the going public and the exit. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the exit behavior of venture capitalists in Germany. 
In particular, we analyze whether VCs were able to exploit these ideal exit opportunities by 
selling shares either at the time of the IPO or in the secondary market at higher prices. In addi­
tion, we investigate for those IPOs that went public at the peak of the market whether the VC 
missed the optimal exit point and is still invested in the IPO. We find empirical evidence that 
VCs were able to time their exit quite successfully in the primary market and to some extent 
also in the secondary market. Obviously, those firms that went public in the year 2000 planned 
their IPO too late in the stock market cycle so that - due to the mandatory lock-up period of six 
months - some VCs had no chance for a lucrative exit. Some venture capitalists still owned 
shares even three years after the IPO. Thus, lock-up commitments can be quite costly for early 
investors in particular towards the end of a hot issue market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the markets for venture 
capital and initial public offerings in Germany are described. The literature is reviewed in sec­
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tion II and the optimal timing for an IPO and for a venture capital exit is discussed in section
III. The data and methodology are described in section IV. The empirical findings are presented 
in section V in the following order. First we compare the performance of venture-backed and 
non venture-backed IPOs and then analyze the VC exit behavior in the primary market, the 
impact with respect to the lock-up commitment, and the exit behavior in the secondary market. 
Then we extend our empirical analysis by including some additional variables to check for the 
robustness of our previous results with cross sectional regressions. Finally we analyze the buy- 
and-hold returns for IPOs during the hot issue periods of 1999 and 2000. This study ends with a 
summary and conclusions.
I. Venture Capital and Initial Public Offerings in Germany
In most economies venture capital and IPO markets are interdependent (Black and Gil­
son, 1998). This is also the case in Germany. In the following sections we analyze the German 
markets for venture capital and for initial public offerings.
A. Venture Capital
The market for venture capital was not well established in Germany for a long period of 
time and is still not at a level that would be required to provide sufficient funds for start-up 
firms, given the size of the German economy. In the early 1980s, the total VC volume invested 
by members of the German Venture Capital Association (BVK), the German umbrella organi­
zation for venture capitalists, hardly exceeded an amount of one billion Euros. In the 1990s, 
however, the VC volume started to increase impressively. The amount of venture capital pro­
vided by members of the BVK for the period from 1983 to 2003 is documented in Figure I. 
Within this period VC volume increased from € 0.4 billion to € 39.9 billion. This amounts to an 
average annual growth rate of close to 30%. Obviously, this strong growth rate is the result of 
the global boom in technology stocks in the late 1990s and the opening of the Neuer Markt in
1997.
Despite the immense growth rate, the German VC market may still be considered un­
derdeveloped by international standards. In 2002, the total volume of new venture capital in­
vestments in the United States was $ 62.7 billion which amounts to 0.60% of U.S. GDP. In the 
United Kingdom, venture capitalists invested $ 9.6 billion or about 0.62% of U.K. GDP. Even 
in France new venture investments exceeded $ 5.5 billion or about 0.39% of GDP in 2002. In 
contrast, venture capital investments in Germany amounted only to about $ 2.4 billion or 0.21% 
of GDP in 2002 (for detailed data see PWC/3i, 2003). Thus, these figures support the view of 
an underdeveloped VC market in Germany. The volume of invested funds will have to improve 
substantially in the future in order to provide sufficient risk capital so that start-up firms with 
promising prospects can be financed.
Additional insights into the current structure of the German VC market may be gained 
by analyzing the different sources of venture financing as well as the various exit routes used in 
recent years. Table la shows the sources of new VC funds for the period 1997 to 2000. Over 
that period the volume more than doubled from € 2,186 million to € 5,803 million. Neverthe­
less, due to the German universal banking system, financial institutions supplied a substantial 
fraction of VC investments. In fact, in 1997 banks provided 58% of the new venture capital. 
However, the relative involvement of banks has decreased continuously over recent years. In 
2000, banks contributed about the same amount in absolute terms but only 29% of total new 
funds. This decrease reflects the shift to other sources of VC financing. While insurance com­
panies’ proportion of VC volume increased from 10% to 17% from 1997-2000, the amount 
invested more than quadrupled. Interestingly, since the year 2000 pension funds also began 
increasing their supply of to d s  for venture capital financing in Germany. Such behaviour is 
usually the case in market based financial systems, hi addition, the share of the public sector
increased from 5% to 16%.
Obviously, the willingness to provide venture capital fiinds is related to the opportunity 
to exit from the venture at favorable terms later on. In principle, the VC has the following alter­
natives to exit: trade sale, management buy back, initial public offering or secondary purchase. 
The investment is written off if the venture fails. Table Ib shows the importance of various exit 
routes for German VCs for the period surrounding the Neuer Markt from 1997 to 2003. During 
this period the volume increased from € 728 million to € 2,132 million in 2002 but declined to 
€ 820 million in 2003. Over this period VCs sold about 30% of their investments by trade sale. 
Buy backs by initial shareholders or management fluctuated between 3.7% in 2002 and 30% in
1998. Up to 14% of VC exits were realized by secondary purchases (2003). IPOs became popu­
lar during the time of very favorable exit conditions between 1998 and 2000. During this pe­
riod, VCs sold up to 14% (1998) of their equity stake by bringing the company to the stock 
market. Beginning in 2001 and triggered by the decline in stock prices, IPOs were no longer a 
viable exit option resulting in not a single IPO in Germany in 2003 (Figure II). Instead, many 
ventures failed and write-offs became the most common exit route with about 40% annually 
between 2001 and 2003. Thus, the Neuer Markt apparently provided the venture capitalists with 
great exit opportunities at least for some time.
B. Initial Public Offerings in the Neuer Markt
Historically, the German financial markets were relatively small and did not offer great 
opportunities for firms to go public. The number of IPOs for the period from 1977 to 2003 is 
shown in Figure II. In the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, less than 10 firms went 
public each year. Over the period from 1983 to 1997 the annual number of new listings was 
between 9 and 33. Given the size of the German economy this is still a very small number. 
With the technology boom in the late 1990s, IPOs suddenly became tremendously popular even 
in Germany. In 1998, 71 firms went public and in the following two years this number in­
creased to 166 (1999) and 160 (2000) IPOs. This period can clearly be labeled as a hot issue 
market. Due to the substantial decline in the stock price levels since March 2000 the IPO activ­
ity slowed dramatically and came to a standstill in 2003. In 2001 only 26 and in 2002 merely 7 
firms went public in Germany. In 2003, there was not even one IPO. Some firms went public in 
2004, but many announced IPOs were eventually withdrawn. Thus, the IPO market in Germany 
is currently in a very difficult position which may be due to the negative performance of the 
previous years, scandals, bankruptcies, and the closing of the Neuer Markt in 2003.
From an institutional perspective the increase in IPO activity in Germany was strongly 
supported by the opening of the Neuer Markt which was established as a special market seg­
ment for small and young growth firms in 1997. The previous attempt in 1989 to establish a 
similar market segment was less successful (Schmidt and Schrader, 1993). To signal the high 
standards of this new market segment, firms had to comply with several very special listing 
requirements of the Neuer Markt. In this form they were novel. First of all, IPOs were forced to 
raise substantial new equity capital as at least half of the issuing volume had to consist of pri­
mary shares. The reason for this requirement was that the exchange thought that growth firms 
always need additional equity capital. Furthermore, IPOs were forced to use the sometimes
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substantial cash inflow from the IPO to finance growth. Debt repayment was not an option al­
lowed for these firms. Moreover, additional equity capital could not be issued during the first 
six months. Thus, all required funds had to be raised at the time of the IPO, resulting in the 
usual agency and moral hazard problems (Bessler and Kurth, 2004). Most important - and of 
special interest for this study - initial shareholders had to commit to a mandatory lock-up period 
of at least six months. Such requirements were also used in other markets such as the U.S. and 
the U.K., but in those markets they were based on a voluntary contract between the underwriter 
and the firm. The basic idea of lock-up agreements is to signal the quality of the firm as well as 
the commitment of the founders, venture capitalists, and management not to exit the venture 
immediately after the IPO. This requirement was non-negotiable for all shares retained by ini­
tial shareholders. Thus, initial shareholders could either sell shares in the primary market or in 
the secondary market after six months of trading. Again, this created certain agency problems 
and opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists, banks, undervsriters, and analysts (Bessler 
and Kurth, 2005). However, after the lock-up period, large equity stakes could be sold unno­
ticed by initial shareholders or management because there were no disclosure requirements. 
Bessler et al. (2003) even argue that this special legal environment of the German Stock Ex­
change, which was based on private law not public law, may have contributed significantly to 
the problems and failure of the Neuer Markt. Moreover, and very interestingly, there are special 
tax laws in Germany for the treatment of capital gains. Although this was not an important 
regulation for institutional investors, the private investor was locked-in by tax laws in that capi­
tal gains were not taxable after a holding period of 6  months until the end of 1998. This period 
was extended to 12 months at the beginning of 1999. Thus, a very special legal environment 
influenced the exit behavior of private and institutional investors in the German Neuer Markt. 
This behavior v^th respect to lock-up periods and tax laws resulted in significant stock price 
reactions.
The Neuer Markt is a perfect reflection of the rise and fall of the German IPO market. 
As presented in Figure III, the Nemax Allshare Index rose from about 500 in March 1997 to 
8,583 in March 2000. Thus, within three years, the index increased by about 1,600%. Many 
firms exploited this “window of opportunity” in a hot issue market and listed either in 1999 or 
in 2000. More than 80% of all German initial public offerings in the Neuer Markt occurred 
v^thin that period. Thus, on average more firms went public within a month during that period 
than v^thin one year in the 1980s. However, the decline of the index from its peak of 8,583 in 
March 2000 to a level of 353 on October 8 , 2002, a decline of 96%, was dramatic. Thus, the 
Deutsche Boerse AG finally closed the Neuer Markt segment in 2003 in response to this de­
cline, but also due to several company scandals and legal problems (Bessler and Kurth, 2003). 
In sum, the attempt to overcome the traditional bank based financial system and to create a suc­
cessful stock market segment in particular for innovative grow1;h firms was clearly not a long 
term success. Nevertheless, the hot issue market of 1999 and 2000 was unique for the German 
stock market. Especially for growth firms it provided a great “window of opportunity” to issue 
new equity at relatively high prices. This was also a great opportunity for venture capitalist to 
sell their equity stakes either in the primary or secondary market at relatively high prices. How­
ever, for both the timing was essential.
II. Literature Review
The importance of venture capital has been well documented in the academic literature 
in that an efficient venture capital market is important in providing risk capital for start-up
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firms, thereby reducing the financing problems for risky ventures and stimulating economic 
growth (Gompers and Lemer, 1999a). Hence, supporting venture capital firms has become a 
pivotal element on the political agenda in some countries. Recently, France increased the per­
centage that insurance companies can invest as venture capital (Handelsblatt, September 8, 
2004, p. 19). The main reason for such a support is that first of all venture capitalists perform 
important functions during the start-up phase of a company such as screening and consulting 
(Berlin, 1998). They further increase the success rate by closely monitoring and enforcing in­
centive compatible contracts (bonding) so that management is motivated to maximize the mar­
ket value of the venture (Gompers and Lemer, 1999a).
If venture capitalists do have a significantly positive influence on the success and per­
formance of start-up firms, this should be observable initially at the time of the initial public 
offering and then in a superior long-run performance of the IPO. Because some venture capital­
ists more often use initial public offerings as an exit route than trade sales or share buy backs, 
one would expect that the VC is sensitive to any negative reputation effects that may be caused 
by an underperforming IPO or by any inappropriate exit behavior. Consequently, reasonable 
offer prices and prudent exit behavior can be generally expected. If this is the case, venture 
capitalists should be in a position to signal the quality and value of an IPO, thereby reducing 
the adverse selection problems (certification hypothesis). Hence, venture-backed IPOs should 
have a lower underpricing and a superior long-run performance compared to non venture- 
backed IPOs. In contrast, it seems quite realistic to assume that venture capitalists possess pri­
vate information and will seek an optimal exit either in the primary or secondary market in or­
der to maximize their own return on investment. Thus, it may not be surprising that VCs possi­
bly will exploit privileged information to the disadvantage of investors either in the primary or 
secondary market.
So far the empirical evidence on these issues is mixed. Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
for example, find for U.S. venture-backed IPOs on average a lower underpricing. In contrast, 
Barry et al. (1990) observe a lower underpricing only when experienced VCs are involved. In 
contrast, Francis and Hasan (2001), Smart and Zutter (2003) as well as Lee and Wahal (2004) 
find opposite results in that they document even higher initial returns for venture-backed IPOs. 
Brav and Gompers (1997), who investigate long-run performance, find superior returns for ven- 
ture-backed IPOs. A special exit timing ability of VCs is also reported by Lemer (1994). This 
latter result is confirmed by Gompers and Lemer (1998) who observe that venture-backed IPOs 
significantly outperform before the exit of the venture capitalist and significantly imderperform 
thereafter. In a more recent line of research. Field and Hanka (2001) provide evidence that VCs 
sell a substantial percentage of their shareholdings immediately after the lock-up period ex­
pires, thus making the end of the lock-up period an important valuation event. In addition, Brav 
and Gompers (2003) find extended lock-up periods for those IPOs that may have some severe 
agency problems. This suggests that lock-up commitments in general as well as the length of 
the lock-up period may be used as a positive signaling device.
Nevertheless, the primary objective of venture capital firms is to eam a superior risk 
adjusted return for their investors. This means an initial investment in a promising venture at a 
relatively low price and an exit at a relatively high price. Venture capitalists might be in a posi­
tion to influence both. Depending on the venture, the expected retums of a successful invest­
ment is close to 60% annually (Berlin, 1998). Gompers und Lemer (2003) also document for 
the U.S. annual retums of more than 50% during boom markets. However, in a weak market 
environment such as that at the end of the technology bubble in 2001, this can change into
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negative returns. This raises the question of an optimal point in time for exit. The two most 
prominent dates are either at the time of the IPO or after the expiration of the lock-up period. In 
the U.S. venture capitalists usually do not sell a large percentage of their stake at the time of the 
IPO, but often continue to play an active role in the company, for example, on the board of di­
rectors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lin and Smith, 1998).
For Germany the long-run performance of IPOs was investigated by Bessler and Thies
(2004) for the period fi'om 1970 to 1995, which is a period before the opening of the Neuer 
Markt. They find the usual long-run underperformance (36 months) with the exception that 
IPOs with subsequent season equity offerings (SSEO) outperformed the market significantly. 
Bessler et al. (1998) also examine IPOs’ operating as well as stock market performance in 
Germany for the same period. They find some evidence that corporate governance issues, i.e., 
the German universal banking system, may influence both the firms’ decisions to go public and 
their performance in the secondary market. For the Neuer Markt in Germany, a number of stud­
ies investigated the impact of venture capitalists on the underpricing of IPOs, but do not find a 
significant difference between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs. Surprisingly, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between the reputation of the VC and underpricing, 
meaning that IPOs backed by reputable VCs are more underpriced (Franzke, 2001; Tykvova 
and Walz, 2004). Despite these findings, venture capitalists in Germany appear to sell more 
shares at the time of the IPO than their U.S. counterparts (Bessler and Kurth, 2004). Moreover, 
there is some empirical evidence that venture-backed IPOs are significantly more underpriced 
when the VC is either a member of the underwriting syndicate or a subsidiary of a bank 
(Bessler and Kurth, 2005). Obviously, there are severe conflicts of interest between VC financ­
ing, IPO underwriting and commercial banking. Empirical evidence for these problematic rela­
tionships is also provided in a study by Ber et al. (2001) for Israel.
There are only a few studies that investigate the long-run performance of venture- 
backed IPOs in the German Neuer Markt. The findings are generally an underperformance rela­
tive to other IPOs after 3 years. One frequently given explanation for these results is the inexpe­
rience of German venture capital firms (Rindermann, 2004; Tykvova and Walz, 2004). In con­
trast, Bessler and Kurth (2005) find strong indications that VCs and especially bank-affiliated 
VCs time their exit quite well in the primary as well as in the secondary market. When bank- 
affiliated VCs sell a major part of their shares at the time of the IPO, these firms underperform 
significantly in the secondary market. The opposite is generally true if bank-affiliated VCs keep 
their shares. It is very interesting to observe that there is a strong superior performance in the 
first six months of trading, but a tremendous decline in abnormal returns (BHAR) later on. Ob­
viously, the end of the lock-up period is an import point in time in that we often observe a dra­
matic change in stock price performance. Nowak and Gropp (2002) also fmd empirical evi­
dence for this notion by observing negative abnormal returns when the lock-up period expires. 
However, Bessler and Kurth (2005) find that the negative returns are more related to capital 
gains taxation (tax lock-up period) than to the regulatory lock up-period. Thus, it is important to 
take a closer look over the stock market cycle at the optimal timing of an initial public offering 
and the exit fi:om the venture.
III. Optimal IPO Timing and Venture Capital Exit Timing
The Neuer Markt offers an ideal opportunity to analyze the behavior of management 
and venture capitalist with respect to exit strategies and market timing during the hot issue 
market of 1999 and 2000. A very important aspect from both the firm’s perspective as well as
that of the VC is that usually both have similar objectives, i.e., maximizing their own benefits 
with respect to the timing of an IPO and the timing of an exit, respectively. However, the point 
in time for an optimal revenue maximizing IPO on the one hand, and for an optimal return 
maximizing exit of the VC on the other hand, most likely differs. This is especially the case in a 
very volatile stock market, or more precisely, in a market with an extremely large increase and 
a sharp decline over a short period of time. On the Neuer Markt, the Nemax index increased 
from 2.979 on January 4, 1999, to 8,559 on March 10, 2000, and then declined again to 2,743 
on December 29, 2000. This all happened within a period of 24 months. Finally the Nemax 
declined as low as 353 in October 2002 ( F i^ e  III).
Such an extremely volatile market is particularly risky for VCs in the regulatory envi­
ronment of the German Stock Exchange where shareholders on the Neuer Markt were faced 
with a mandatory non-negotiable lock-up period of at least six months. Thus, the best possible 
time for an IPO and the optimal time for a VC exit may be six months apart. Because another 
special regulation of the German Stock Exchange forced the firms to issue new equity at the 
time of the IPO (Bessler et al., 2003; Bessler and Kurth, 2004), the offer price really mattered 
in that firms clearly tried to issue new securities at the highest possible stock market level. Ob­
viously, the general VC objective is also to exit the venture around the highest stock market 
level. Thus, the first window of opportunity for the VC to exit the IPO was usually six months 
after the initial public offering. Consequently, this regulatory requirement may add to the po­
tential conflicts of interest between management and the VC due to the fact that stock market 
levels do not stay constant for very long. As a matter of fact, the difference in stock prices after 
6 moiiths can be quite severe as is easily observed in Figure III.
IV. Data and Methodology
In the following sections we first describe our sample data and then the methodology 
employed in our empirical analysis.
A. Data
The sample for our empirical analysis includes 251 firms that went public at the Neuer 
Markt during the hot-issue market between January 1999 and December 2000. From this group 
of 251 IPOs, 86 firms received venture capital financing before the IPO. All this information is 
taken from the IPO prospectus. The main characteristics of all 251 IPOs (of the 86  venture- 
backed as well as the 165 non venture-backed) are presented in Table II. A comparison reveals 
that the venture-backed IPOs are on average significantly smaller than the non venture-backed 
IPOs.
Moreover, there are significant differences between venture-backed and non venture- 
backed IPOs with respect to various ownership structure characteristics. With regard to the is­
suing size and valuation of primary and secondary shares the owners in venture-backed IPOs 
sell more shares (2 2 .0 1 %) at the time of the initial public offering than the owners in non ven­
ture-backed IPOs (16.12%). The participation ratio, which is the number of secondary shares 
sold at the IPO date relative to the number of pre IPO shares, is 10.98% and 6.89%, respec­
tively. In addition, venture-backed IPOs issue more primary shares than non venture-backed 
IPOs. Thus, the dilution factor (primary shares / number of shares pre IPO) is 37.15% relative 
to 33.47%. At a first glance, these differences do not appear to be that substantial, but they are 
all statistically significant, indicating some important differences between these two groups of 
IPOs. In the empirical part venture-backed IPOs are defined by a venture capital stake of at
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least 4% before the IPO. As documented in Table III, the VC equity stake is on average 29.34% 
with a minimum of 4.38% and a maximum of 89.80%. The percentage of shares sold at the 
time of the IPO is between -49.74% and 100%, meaning that some VCs increased their holding 
and some sold all shares immediately. Due to the initial public offerings, the average VC stake 
decreases to 16.77% in the secondary market. Thus, about 25% of the shares are sold at the 
time of the IPO.
B. Methodology
Initial returns (underpricing) of the IPO are calculated by relating the first price in the 
secondary market to the issuing price. The long-run performance is measured by holding period 
returns (BHR) which are calculated for a single stock i for time period T as follows:
BHR =
-1 (1)
where Ri,t is the return of stock i at time t, and T is the time period for which the BHR is deter­
mined. For an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks the return is calculated as:
(2)
■‘V
where dBHRpj is the average BHR of the portfolio, N is the number of stocks in the portfolio, 
and T is the time period for which the BHR is calculated. To calculate “Buy-and-Hold- 
Abnormal-Retums” (“BHAR”) the return of the benchmark is subtracted from the IPO return.
1 ^
BHAR = — y
N t ; V r=l \  t= \
(3)
The advantage of this method is that the terminal values of the two strategies, i.e., in­
vesting in an IPO or investing in the benchmark, are directly comparable. The “NEMAX All­
share” index is used as the benchmark. This market weighted performance index includes all 
companies that are listed at the Neuer Markt.
We test for the statistical significance of our empirical findings with various method­
ologies. Because abnormal returns are highly skewed both parametric and non-parametric tests 
are employed. To analyze whether the mean BHAR is significantly different from zero we em­
ploy a skewness-adjusted t-test as documented in Lyon et al. (1999). Furthermore, we compare 
the BHAR of the two sub-samples. To test whether the abnormal returns of the two groups dif­
fer significantly, a parametric t-test for the differences in means is employed.
We also investigate the impact of venture capital on IPO underpricing and on long-run 
performance (BHAR) for 6 months and 36 months by employing cross-sectional OLS regres­
sions with White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The independent variables 
include the control variables firm size and market-to-book ratio. Firm size corresponds with the 
market value of equity. These two variables adjust the IPO performance for the well known 
impact of size and growth potential (Lyon et a l, 1999; Gompers and Lemer, 1999b). The firm 
size and market-to-book ratio are based on the first market price of the IPO.
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V- Empirical Results
The empirical results for underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs in the Neuer 
Markt are presented in this section. First we examine whether there are significant differences 
between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs (A). We then analyze whether there are 
differences with respect to other characteristics such as the exit behavior at the time of the IPO 
(B) as well as the impact of the lock-up commitment (C). In addition, we test for the robustness 
of our results with some cross sectional regressions (D). Finally, we investigate the exit deci­
sion of venture capitalists as well as the long-run performance of IPOs by employing raw re­
turns instead of abnormal returns (E). By analyzing raw returns we follow the approach by 
Lowry (2003) who investigated the return behavior of initial public offerings in the U.S. in hot 
and cold issue markets. She does not find any differences in return behavior between hot and 
cold issue markets, but documents inferior raw returns for IPOs which initially listed in a hot 
issue market.
A. Results for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs
As discussed in the literature review there is the testable hypothesis that venture capital­
ists, due to their special screening, monitoring, and consulting abilities, should have a positive 
impact on firm quality and IPO performance. Thus, we first analyze the returns of the 8 6  ven- 
ture-backed and the 165 non venture-backed IPOs with respect to initial returns (underpricing) 
and long-run performance. The results are presented in Figure IV and Table IV. Both sub­
samples reveal a significant underpricing of 54.48% for venture-backed and 42.68% for non 
venture-backed IPOs. Moreover, the abnormal returns (BHAR) after 6 months of trading are 
positive with significant returns of 31.92% and 22.46%, respectively. Interestingly, after 36 
months of trading (750 trading days) the performance of the IPOs in both sub-samples is nearly 
identical with 0.54% and 2.87%, respectively. These results suggest that, on average, the initial 
shareholders (owners) have much better exit opportunities after 6 months than either at the time 
of the IPO or later on. It is important to note that the difference in initial returns (underpricing) 
and returns after 6 and 36 months for the venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs is not 
statistically significant, meaning that our conclusions in general apply to both groups of IPOs. 
It is also evident from Figure IV that there is hardly any difference between these two groups of 
IPOs. We therefore have to conclude from our empirical analysis that VC involvement does not 
appear to have a significant impact on IPO underpricing (initial returns) and on IPO long-run 
performance.
Our findings are to some extent in contrast to the empirical literature. One possible ex­
planation for this is that German venture capitalists, given the dramatic increase in VC fimds 
during the 1990s, did not have the experience, the ability or the time period needed to have a 
significant impact in order to outperform non venture-backed IPOs. It has to be added that es­
pecially IPOs in the year 2000 did not have the operating and financial performance yet for a 
successful listing. The great opportunity that an extremely high stock price level offered con­
vinced many CEOs to go public sooner than later even when this was up to several years before 
the firm were realistically ready for an exchange listing. Thus, this very special market envi­
ronment may not be the most adequate setting to make a verdict on the quality and contribution 
of venture capitalists.
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B. Venture Capital and Exit in the Primary Market
The venture capitalist usually has the choice to sell the shares either in the primary or 
secondary market. Given the assumed private information advantage of the VC, an immediate 
exit at the time of the IPO could be interpreted by the market as a signal of expected inferior 
performance for the foreseeable future. In contrast, a commitment by the venture capitalist to 
keep the equity stake for some time after going public should usually be interpreted as a posi­
tive signal about expected long-run returns. In fact, it has to be assumed that the venture capi­
talist who stays invested in the stock is hoping for a superior exit opportunity later on. In order 
to analyze the exit behavior in more detail we separate the 86  venture-backed IPOs into two 
sub-samples. The first group includes 43 IPOs in which the VCs sold a relatively higher per­
centage of their shares at the time of the IPO (High VC Exit). The other group includes the re­
maining 43 IPOs in which the VCs sold a relatively low percentage of the equity stake in the 
primary market (Low VC Exit). The empirical results are presented in Figure V and Table V. 
They reveal that the group with the higher exit behavior at the time of the IPO has, as expected, 
a higher underpricing of 65.16% compared to 43.80%. Thus, the market seems to be aware of 
potential agency problems. After the first 6 months of trading this group has not only a rela­
tively low and insignificant performance of only 11.18% but also a significantly inferior per­
formance relative to the other group (52.66%). Thus, for the second group with the higher 
commitment at the time of the IPO we first find a lower and significant initial return (under- 
pricing) of 43.80% and then a higher and significant overperformance over the first six months 
of trading of 52.66%. Interestingly, immediately after the end of the lock-up period we observe 
a sharp decline in relative performance so that the two groups started to be hardly distinguish­
able after 12 months of trading. After 36 months the retums are not significantly different from 
zero (-3.02% and 4.10%) and there is no significant difference in BHAR between these two 
groups. The difference in the relative performance of the two groups becomes very obvious in 
Figure V. It appears that the IPOs in which venture capitalists had sold their shares at the time 
of the IPO do not have a price increase at all. In contrast, the VC group that does not exit at the 
time of the IPO has an excellent relative performance for the first six months of trading. The 
highest abnormal retums (BHAR) are reached around the end of the lock-up period. Subse­
quently the retums start to decline sharply. A look at the performance chart clearly indicates 
that an exit immediately after the end of the lock-up period was an exceptional time to sell the 
shares. Thus, the VCs had either a great ability to forecast retum patterns very precisely or they 
or someone else had the opportunity to positively influence stock prices in the secondary mar­
ket. Bessler and Kurth (2005) find for a larger sample of IPOs empirical evidence that buy rec­
ommendations by analysts that provided venture capital financing to the IPO have a positive 
impact on the performance over the first 6 months of trading. Thus, the German universal bank­
ing system may have some inherent agency problems that are exploited to the disadvantage of 
the small investor. In any case, such a price behavior offers the venture capitalist an ideal exit 
environment at the end of the lock-up period. Whether the lock-up period in general has some 
impact on underpricing and performance is investigated in the next section.
C. Venture Capital and Lock-up Commitment
The rules and regulation with respect to the lock-up period on the Neuer Markt in Ger­
many are unique in that a minimum period of six months is mandatory and non-negotiable, 
whereas in other countries it is usually based on a contract between the firm and the under­
writer that can take various forms (Bessler et al., 2003). In our sample in 22 out of 84 venture-
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backed IPOs the VCs made a commitment to extend the required lock-up period for a maxi­
mum of 12 months. Two IPOs had to be dropped because all shares were already sold in the 
primary market. Because of the extended lock-up periods we also analyze BHAR after 12 
months in this section and omit the 36 months in the table. An extension that is voluntary 
should signal the confidence of the venture capitalist in the future performance of the IPO. 
Thus, we would expect a lower underpricing and a superior long-run performance for these 
firms due to the VCs involvement. Nevertheless, an extended lock-up period could also be de­
manded by the underwriter in order to place the shares successfully in the market and therefore 
may signal adverse selection problems (Goergen et al., 2004).
The empirical findings are presented in Figure VI and Table VI. A comparison of the 
results for both groups reveals that the initial return of 52.58% of the 22 IPOs with extended 
lock-up periods is almost the same as the significant initial returns of 51.24% of the IPOs with 
the standard 6 months lock-up period. However, after 6 months of trading the stocks with the 6 
months lock-up period have significant BHAR of 37.02% compared to 22.08% for the other 
group. After 12 months of trading the return pattern has reversed in that the group with the 12 
months lock-up period now has BHAR of 34.46% compared to 17.43%. After 36 months the 
returns for both groups are quite similar with insignificant BHAR of 0.65% and 2.43%.
The retum pattern in Figure VI seems to indicate that the group with the 6  months lock­
up period was fortunate to have the performance peak close to the end of this period, whereas 
the abnormal returns of the other group started to increase later on and reaching a peak some 
time later. There seems to be a parallel shift into the future of about three months. Interestingly, 
the BHAR at the end of each lock-up period are very similar with 37.02% (6  months) for the 
first group and 34.46% (12 months) for the other group. However, the 6 months result is sig­
nificant whereas the 12 months result is insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that the ex­
tended lock-up periods of the venture capitalist are not a credible signal for superior long-run 
performance. Thus, we have to conclude that the empirical evidence does not suggest that an 
extended lock-up period indicates higher firm quality and therefore superior IPO performance.
D. Cross Sectional Regressions
In this section we extend our analysis by including additional variables and testing for 
the robustness of our empirical findings in the previous sections with several cross sectional 
regressions. The results are presented in Table VII. The dependent variables are IPO underpric­
ing or initial returns (Model 1) and BHAR after 6 months and 12 months of trading (Models 2 
and 3, respectively). All models now include the control variables market value of equity (In 
Market Capital) and market-to-book ratio (In Market/Book). The variables “Dummy VC”, 
“Dummy VC is Underwriter”, and “Dummy 2000” are dummy variables equal to 1 if the IPO is 
venture-backed, if the VC is underwriter, or if the IPO listed in the year 2000, respectively. The 
variable “A VC” denotes the change in the number of stocks at the IPO date and “VC Lock-up” 
the length of the lock-up period in months. In addition we analyze the impact of the dilution 
factor and the participation ratio.
In accordance with our findings based on abnormal returns (BHAR) in section A, the 
regression results indicate that the coefficient for the VC dummy variable is not significant in 
any model (Models la, 2a, and 3a). Obviously, our previous observation that VC ownership 
does not have any significant impact on IPOs underpricing and performance is confirmed. 
However, within the group of venture-backed IPOs the magnitude of the ownership has a sig­
nificantly positive impact on IPO performance (Models lb, 2b, and 3b). The higher the per­
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centage of VC ownership, the lower is the IPO underpricing and the higher is the long-run per­
formance. Furthermore, we observe higher initial returns if the VC is a member of the under­
writer syndicate, indicating conflicts of interests when providing both services. This result is 
confirmed in a study by Bessler and Kurth (2005) who employ a larger sample and test for 
these issues in greater detail. The dummy variable ”VC is underwriter” is a measure for the fact 
that the venture capitalist belongs to the underwriter institution. It has a significantly positive 
effect on underpricing for venture-backed IPOs (Model lb). The empirical evidence supports 
the notion that investors are aware of these conflicts of interest and demand higher initial re­
turns when the venture capitalist is part of the underwriter consortium. In addition, the dilution 
factor has a significant impact on underpricing in that a larger number of shares that are issued 
at the time of the IPO results in a higher underpricing. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that 
a high dilution factor in conjunction with high initial returns represents high opportunity costs 
for the IPO in the form of “money left on the table”. In contrast, the participation ratio is sig­
nificant only after 6 months of trading, indicating that shareholders that do exit in the primary 
market are not successfLil in reducing IPO underpricing as argued by Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001). However, they are faced with quite promising exit conditions after the expiration of the 
lock-up period. Overall, we do not find empirical evidence that the performance of venture- 
backed IPOs differs significantly from that of non venture-backed IPOs.
The results of the cross sectional regressions clearly reveal that the BHAR after 6 
months of trading are higher when the venture capitalist keeps the shares, i.e., sells less shares 
at the time of the IPO (Model 2b). Interestingly, the variable ”A VC ownership“ that measures 
the change in VC ownership is still significant after 36 months of trading (Model 3b). Thus, 
there is some evidence for a medium term and long term effect. Moreover, the results suggest 
that the VC is able to time the exit in the secondary market quite well. In contrast, we do not 
find any significant impact of the lock-up factor in the cross sectional regressions. Thus, as 
documented in section B, VCs are not able to signal the quality of the IPO by committing to an 
extended lock-up period. In sum, the empirical findings based on abnormal returns (BHAR) are 
basically confirmed by our cross sectional regression analysis. An analysis of raw returns or 
buy-and-hold-retums (BHR) should add further insights into the performance of venture backed 
IPOs especially with respect to exit strategies. We analyze BHR in the next section.
E. Venture Capital and Exit Behavior in the Secondary Market; An 
Analysis of Raw Returns
Our results in the previous sections reveal that VC exit behavior is to some extend re­
lated to the abnormal performance of the venture-backed IPOs. Therefore, we complement our 
study in this section with an additional analysis of raw returns. The basic idea is that VCs can 
achieve extraordinarily high returns by exiting in hot issue markets, but realize low (or nega­
tive) returns if the stock market declines. Thus, market valuation and IPO raw returns are criti­
cal factors that determine the VC’s optimal exit decision. In declining stock markets, it may be 
sensible to sell the equity stake as soon as possible, i.e., in the primary market. In contrast, in a 
period of increasing stock prices, VCs should be more patient because they have the choice to 
exit in the secondary market any time after the lock-up period expires. In addition, if VCs are 
successful in timing the IPO in order to raise additional capital at relatively high prices, the 
listing date has to be scheduled at least six months before the reversion in stock prices. How­
ever, this applies only to markets with mandatory lock-up periods such as the Neuer Markt. In
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the rest of this section we examine whether VCs succeeded in timing the IPO exit before stock 
prices crashed in the first quarter of 2 0 0 0 .
In Figure VII we present the buy-and-hold returns (BHR) of venture-backed and non 
venture-backed IPOs. Our empirical analysis so far does not provide any evidence o f major 
differences in the stock market performance between each group. The BHR are quite independ­
ent of whether the IPO is venture-backed or not. This is also the case when we separate the 
sample by the years 1999 and 2000 (results are not reported here). Thus, there is no evidence 
that venture capitalists had superior abilities in the market over that period. It appears, however, 
that much of the performance is determined by the year of the IPO. We therefore distinguish 
between IPOs issued in the years 1999 and 2000. As is documented in Figure VIII there were 
profitable exit opportunities for VCs and other initial investors for those firms that went public 
in 1999. Obviously, these investors should have avoided the cost of underpricing of about 45% 
on average and should have sold their shares later on in the secondary market. In 2000, exit 
conditions changed dramatically. The BHR of IPOs is negative. They start to decline immedi­
ately from the very beginning of trading. Despite an underpricing of about 49% in 2000, some 
investors were much better off by selling their shares in the primary market instead of commit­
ting to a lock-up period of six months. Thus, VCs had excellent exit conditions in the stock 
market if the IPO initially listed before the third quarter in 1999 but had a difficult environment 
for the IPOs of 2000. This clearly indicates that VCs can profit nicely firom IPOs in hot issue 
markets as long as the lock-up period expires before the stock market reverts. For IPOs initially 
listed in 2000 the VCs hardly had any opportunity to exit profitably in the secondary market 
due to lock-up periods. Staying invested may still be the only sensible option.
Until 2002 there was no data available about individual VC exit behavior in the secon­
dary market. Due to some institutional changes in disclosure requirements in Germany, we now 
do have reliable information available about venture-backed IPO ownership structure after 
about three years of trading. We employ this data for an analysis of VC exit behavior in the 
secondary market. As reported in Table III, VC’s mean (median) IPO ownership amounts to 
4.22% (0.0%). This is strongly reflected in VCs exit behavior in the stock market. In 26 of 84 
cases (31%), the VC still owned shares of the IPO even after about three years of trading. Thus, 
in 58 cases (69%) we do not observe any VC ownership and conclude that the VC must have 
exited sometime between lock-up expiration and the observation date of about 36 months after 
the IPO. Interestingly, these 26 IPOs are firms that went public in the year 2000 (17 IPOs, 
65%). Only 9 IPOs initially were listed in 1999 (35%). Thus, considering only the IPOs of the 
year 1999, VCs exited within three years in about 80% of IPOs. For the venture-backed IPOs of 
2000 this is only true for about 60% of our observations. Thus, the probability of a VC invest­
ment of venture-backed IPOs is about 20% for IPOs of 1999 and 40% for IPOs of 2000. In a 
logit regression not documented here we find strong evidence that the probability of VC in­
vestment after three years is indeed strongly influenced by the year of going public.
These observations are not surprising. For the venture-backed IPOs of 2000, the IPO 
happened too late in the stock market cycle so that the lock-up period had expired after the 
stock market crash in March 2000. Thus, VCs did not have the opportunity to exit successfully. 
In retrospect, many VCs should have sold all of their shares immediately after the lock-up expi­
ration despite the declining stock prices. This is due to the fact that stock prices declined much 
ftirther and did not recover until now. Thus, in 2000 those VCs that are still invested in the IPO 
after three years presumably expected just a temporary decline in stock prices and not a sus­
tained decline in technology stocks. This behavior is not that surprising given the optimistic
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environment at that time. Even the decrease of the Nemax index from 8,500 to 5,500 from 
March to June 2000 kept some market participants extremely optimistic. For example, DG 
Bank, one of the most active underwriters in Neuer Markt IPOs, forecasted in August 2000 that 
an increase of the Nemax back to 8,500 would occur by the end of that year. They also ex­
pected an even further advance to 12,000 by the end of 2001 (DG Bank, 2000). Unfortimately, 
the index was down to 1,100 at that time. Thus, it appears that not all venture capitalists were 
successful in perfectly timing their IPO exit.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Hot issue markets, i.e., periods with very favorable stock market valuations, usually 
provide an ideal setting for firms to go public and for a venture capitalist to exit profitably from 
the venture. In general, the VC can either exit in the primary market at the time of the IPO or 
later in the secondary market. In addition, a combination of both strategies is possible. Regula­
tion of the German Stock Exchange for the Neuer Markt required that initial shareholders had 
to commit to a mandatory lock-up period of at least six months. If stock prices fluctuated sub­
stantially within the first six months of trading these shareholders were constrained to respond 
to significant price decreases and sell their shares immediately in the market. Thus, in the case 
of a mandatory lock-up period with high uncertainty about future stock price movements it may 
be sensible to even forego the usually large initial returns and to exit without delay in the pri­
mary market. However, if VCs have access to private information about firm performance, then 
they may be able to forecast future stock prices and time their exit successfully either in the 
primary or secondary markets. Whether VCs usually have certain abilities in predicting future 
stock prices, however, is doubtful indeed. Thus, a decision to exit or not at the time of the IPO 
involves quite some speculation about the IPO and stock market performance over the next six 
months.
In this study we examined underpricing (initial retums) and long-run performance of 
firms that went public in the Neuer Markt in 1999 and 2000. In this market segment, the time 
window of opportunity for a very lucrative going public and a profitable exit lasted only for 
several months. Although we apply different methodologies in our empirical analysis we do not 
find significant differences in the performance between venture-backed and non venture- 
backed IPOs. However, we do have some indications of excellent exit timing within the group 
of venture-backed IPOs. We first examine VC’s exit decision at the IPO date and find strong 
evidence that VCs indeed timed their exit successfully. Thus, VC’s exit behavior is a strong 
predictor of IPO abnormal performance in particular in the first six months of trading. The lar­
ger the number of shares that the VCs sell at the time of the IPO, the lower is the IPO perform­
ance after the expiration of the lock-up period. Second, the length of the lock-up period to 
which the VCs commit has no significant impact on the IPO performance. Thus, it is not clear 
at all whether voluntary extended lock-up periods signal higher IPO quality.
Finally, we investigate whether VC ownership after three years of trading is determined 
by general stock market conditions. From the initial shareholder and especially the venture 
capitalist perspective, it appears that those IPOs that were listed in 1999 had good opportunities 
to exit. In contrast, IPOs of the year 2000 did not have any opportunity for a profitable exit. For 
firms that went public in 1999, the VCs usually sold their shares within the first three years, 
most likely within the first year in the secondary market. For venture-backed IPOs that listed in 
2000, it appears that many VCs did not exit at the time of the IPO and were surprised by the 
stock market crash in March 2000. There is some empirical evidence that they were prevented
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from an optimal exit due to the mandatory lock-up period and are still invested in the IPO three 
years after the initial public offering. Obviously, from the perspective of the venture capitalist, 
the IPOs of the year 2000 decided to go public too late in the stock market cycle, although this 
was an optimal time for selling shares and raising additional equity. Consequently, lock-up 
commitments are costly agreements or signaling devices towards the end of a hot new issue 
market.
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Figure I
Total Portfolio Volume Held by Members of the BVK (in € Billion)
For the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 VC volume includes investments by pan-European 
funds of € 6.6, € 2.0 and € 5.1 billion, respectively.
Volume in Billion €  
40 T
35 -  
30 -  
25 -  
20  -  
15 -  
10 -  
5 -  
0
39.9
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.8
3.4 3.6 3.9 4.5
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Source: BVK (2004).
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Table la
New Funds Raised of VC in Germany (in Million €)
Year Volume Banks Insurance Pension Funds Public Sector
1997 2186 58.0% 10.0% 12.0% 5.0%
1998 1594 50.0% 14.0% 14.0% 4.0%
1999 4310 29.0% 10.0% 30.0% 12.0%
2000 5803 29.0% 17.0% 12.0% 16.0%
Source: BVK (2004).
Table Ib
VC Exit-Routes in Germany
Year Volume Trade Sale Buy Back IPO Secondary
Purchase
W rite-off
1997 728 34.1% 21.6% 2.7% 4.4% 15.0%
1998 537 22.5% 30.0% 14.0% 0.0% 17.0%
1999 769 25.1% 20.7% 12.6% 4.0% 21%
2000 1262 39.0% 17.1% 9.2% 7.4% 18.4%
2001 1855 20.4% 18.0% 0.4% 7.9% 36.3%
2002 2132 30.6% 3.7% 0.0% 11.7% 44.1%
2003 820 17.8% 9.9% 1.1% 14.0% 40.2%
Source: BVK (2004).
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Figure II
Number of IPOs in Germany
Source: DAI, own calculations.
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Figure III
Number of IPOs per Month and Neuer Markt Index (Nemax)
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Table II
IPO Characteristics
VB IPOs and NVB IPOs are venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs, respec­
tively. Median values are shown in squared brackets. Issues size contains the greenshoe 
option if  exercised. This option allows the underwriter to buy additional shares from the
All IPOs 
(251)
Mean
[Median]
VB IPOs (86)
Mean
[Median]
NVB IPOs 
(165)
Mean
[Median
t-Test
(Difference 
in Means)
A. Size and V aluation
81.42 52.04 96.74
Issue Size [Mio. €1 -2.27**L J [43.55] [40.28] [44.00]
Market Value Primary 369.36 158.72 479.15
-1.88*
Market [Mio. €] [133.30] [112.46] [154.65]
Market Value Secon­ 487.78 248.26 612.62
-1 98**
dary Market [Mio. €] [200.03] [155.13] [209.06]
1 O
B. Prim ary and Secondary Shares
Secondary Shares/ Is­ 18.14 22.01 16.12 9 QO***
sued Shares [%] [14.82] [21.20] [13.04]
 ^O
8.29 10.98 6.89
Participation Ratio [%‘
[6.23] [9.00] [4.98]
3 4^7***
34.73 37.15 33.47
Dilution Factor [Vo 2.01**
[33.33] [33.95] [33.11]
issuing firm at the issue price. The market values in the primary and secondary market 
are based on IPO issue prices and first stock market prices, respectively. The participa­
tion ratio is the ratio of secondary shares sold to the number o f shares pre IPO. The dilu­
tion factor is the ratio of primary shares newly issued to the number of shares pre IPO. 
***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table III 
VC Ownership
VC ownership post IPO represents the information just after the IPO.
N Mean Median STD Min. Max.
Pre IPO (%) 86 29.34 24.40 20.25 4.38 89.80
Post IPO (%) 86 16.46 13.34 12.92 0.00 71.30
% Shares Sold 86 26.12 22.36 25.11 -49.74 100.00
Lock-up (Month) 84 7.50 6.00 2.57 6.00 12.00
Ownership after 3 years 
(%) 84 4.22 0.00 9.78 0.00 76.49
42
Figure IV
BHAR for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs for the First 3 Years
The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad-
40%
^Venture-B acked IPOs (N=86)
Non Venture-Backed IPOs (N=165)
151 201 251 301 351 401 451 501 551 651 701
Lock-up Trading Days
ing days. The vertical line represents the end o f the lock-up period of six months.
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Table IV
Underpricing and BHARs for Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs
VB IPOs and NVB IPOs are venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs, respec­
tively. N  denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T (adj.) and T (Means) 
the t-values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences o f means, 
respectively. and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
N Mean Median STD T(adj.) T(Means)
U nderpricing
VB-IPO 86 54.48 21.48 77.19 9.56***
1.19
NVB-IPO 165 42.68 14.29 70.03 11 70***
BHAR 123
VB-IPO 86 31.92 -10.16 112.80 3.27***
0.64
NVB-IPO 165 22.46 -6.20 108.94 3.15***
BHAR 750
VB-IPO 86 0.54 -4.46 26.52 0.19
-0.60
NVB-IPO 165 2.87 -4.33 33.92 1.22
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Figure V
VC Exit at Time of IPO (Primary Market)
The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad­
ing days. The vertical line represents the end of the lock-up period o f six months.
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Table V
VC Exit at Time of IPO (Primary Market)
The venture-backed IPOs are separated in two sub-samples by the median value of 
shares sold at the IPO date. N  denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T 
(adj.) and T (Means) the t values from a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differ­
ences in means, respectively. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively.
N Mean Median STD T(adj.) T(Means)
U nderpricing
High VC Exit 43 65.16 29.41 82.94 7 54***
1.29
Low VC Exit 43 43.80 9.80 70.34 6.08***
BHAR 123
High VC Exit 43 11.18 -14.60 75.66 1.05
-1.72*
Low VC Exit 43 52.66 6.83 138.36 2 39***
BHAR 750
High VC Exit 43 -3.02 -4.47 22.97 0.99
-1.25
Low VC Exit 43 4.10 -4.03 29.50 1.01
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Figure VI
VC Lock-up Commitment
The returns are mean BHAR with the Nemax index as benchmark for the first 750 trad-
60%
- 10%
6 Months 12 Months
— VC Lock-up > 6 M (N=22) 
VC Lock-up = 6 M (N=62)
51 101
-- 1--------1------- -------- 1--------r
151 201 251 301 351 401 451 501 651 701
Lock-up Periods Trading Days
ing days. The vertical lines represent the end of the lock-up periods.
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Table VI
VC Lock-up Commitment
The venture-backed IPOs are separated in two sub-samples by the length o f lock-up 
commitment. N denotes the sample size, STD the standard deviation, T (adj.) and T 
(Means) the t values generated by a skewness-adjusted t-test and a t-test for differences 
in means, respectively. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respec­
tively.
N Mean Median STD T (adj.) T(Means)
U nderpricing
Lock-up = 6 M 62 52.58 21.48 77.67 7 95***
0.08
Lock-up > 6 M 22 5L24 10.63 68.15 4.80***
BHAR 123
Lock-up = 6 M 62 37.02 -11.80 126.30 2,86***
0.69
Lock-up > 6 M 22 22.08 3.78 68.76 1.79*
BHAR 250
Lock-up = 6 M 62 17.43 -6.20 131.81 1.14
-0.54Lock-up = 12 
M 20 34.46 -5.18 120.45 1.67
Cross Sectional Regressions
The table on the following page reports OLS regression results with W hite’s heteroske- 
dasticity-consistent standard errors. The dependent variables are IPO initial returns 
(model 1) and BHAR after 6 months and 12 months o f trading (models 2 and 3). All 
models include the control variables market value o f equity (In Market Cap.) and mar- 
ket-to-book ratio (In Market/Book). The variables Dummy VC, Dummy VC is Under­
writer, and Dummy 2000 are dummy variables equal to 1 if  the IPO is venture-backed, 
if  the VC is underwriter, and if  the IPO listed in 2000, respectively. A VC denotes the 
change in the number o f stocks at the IPO date and VC Lock-up the length o f lock-up 
period in months. The dilution factor is the ratio o f primary shares newly issued and the 
number o f shares pre IPO. The participation ratio is the ratio o f secondary shares sold 
and the number of shares pre IPO. a, b, and c are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively.
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Table VII
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Underpricing BHAR 6 Months BHAR 36 Months
Model la Model lb Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
Intercept
-3.26
[-5.39"]
-2.45
[-2.38^]
-1.53
[-1.09]
-5.76
[-1.49]
-0.27
[-0.50]
1.34
[1.67]
In Market Cap.
0.06
[1.70^
0.01
[0.22]
0.15
[2.04*^ ]
0.44
[1.98^]
0.04
[1.31]
-0.06
[-1.45]
In Market/Book
1.22
[9.49T
1.24
[6.20"]
-0.48
[-2.29*’]
-0.94
[-3.41"]
-0.22
[-4.91"]
-0.13
[-2.25*’]
Dummy VC
0.01
[0.18]
0.22
[1.42]
-0.00
[-0.4]
VC Ownership 
pre IPO
-3.73*10-'
[-1.80^
-0.01
[-0.95]
3.78*10'"
[1.93T
A VC Owner­
ship
0.34
[1.51]
1.67
[2.19^]
0.16
[1.90T
VC Lock-up
0.00
[0.18]
0.04
[1.17]
-0.01
[-0.54]
Dummy VC is 
Underwriter
0.19
[2.08‘^]
0.27
[0.97]
0.04
[0.58]
Dummy 2000
-0.03
[-0.53]
-0.11
[-1.10]
-0.42
[-2.81"]
-0.84
[-3.08"]
0.02
[0.36]
0.08
[1.54]
Dilution
2.09
[7.54"]
2.30
[4.83"]
-0.22
[-0.34]
-0.50
[-0.45]
-0.11
[-0.54]
-0.00
[-0.00]
Participation
-0.11
[-0.36]
-1.32
[-1.87T
-0.05
[-0.20]
Adjusted 0.59 0.68 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.19
# Observations 251 84 251 84 251 84
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Figure VII
Raw Returns (BHR) of Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed IPOs
The returns are mean BHR for the first 750 trading days. The vertical line represents the
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Figure VIII
Raw Returns (BHR) and the Year of Issuance
The returns are mean BHR for the first 750 trading days. The vertical line represents the
